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On April 23, 2017, Kenneth Humphrey followed an elderly
man into his home and demanded money-he left with seven
dollars and a bottle of cologne.1 A few days later, Humphrey
was arrested and a court ordered that he be held on $350,000
bail.2 However, Humphrey's robbery netted him a total of five
dollars-he did not have enough money to post $350,000 bail.
3
He was an elderly African American man with a criminal record
and a history of drug addiction.4 While these traits disadvan-
taged him in the eyes of the criminal justice system, Humphrey
also had one trait that would ultimately determine his sen-
tence: he was poor.
When Humphrey's case eventually came before the Califor-
nia Court of Appeal, the court declared California's money-bail
system unconstitutional for penalizing the poor.5 The widely
publicized nature of the case prompted the California legisla-
ture to react. On August 28, 2018, the legislature signed the
California Money Bail Reform Act of 2017 (also known as "SB
10") into law.6 As the first piece of legislation to completely
abolish monetary bail,7 California's SB 10 is an unprecedented
step forward in the struggle for bail reform, eliminating a bail
system that puts an unfair "tax on poor people in California."8
However, progressive movements for change often result in
fierce counter-movements, and California's bail reform move-
ment will be no different.9
This Note addresses the arguments that will likely be
raised against SB 10 and provides a response to these chal-
lenges. Part I discusses the historical background of monetary
bail, the bail reform movement in both the federal and state
1 In re Humphrey, 228 Cal. Rptr. 3d 513, 518 (Cal. Ct. App. 2018).
2 Id. at 519, 522.
3 Id at 522.
4 See id. at 520.
5 Id. at 530.
6 Thomas Fuller, California Is the First State to Scrap Cash Bail, N.Y. TMMES
(Aug. 28, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/28/us/califomia-cash-bail
.html [https://perma.cc/88GA-WEN2].
7 Id.
8 In 1979, the Governor of California declared in his State of the State Ad-
dress that it was necessary for the Legislature to reform the bail system, which he
said constituted an unfair "tax on poor people in California. Thousands and
thousands of people languish In the jails of this state even though they have been
convicted of no crime. Their only crime is that they cannot make the ball that our
present law requires." Governor Edmund G. Brown Jr., State of the State Address
(Jan. 16, 1979). However, the Legislature did not respond. See In re Humphrey,
228 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 516.
9 See Fuller, supra note 6.
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forums, and the beginning of the current bail reform movement
in California. Part II addresses the main legal and policy chal-
lenges against SB 10, showing how the greatest threats to SB
10 come from policy challenges, rather than legal challenges.
Part III looks at the big picture, discussing the pitfalls of pre-




A. Monetary Bail and Its Effects
Two brothers and a lawyer walk into a bar.
In 1896, the two McDonough brothers realized they could
earn quite a profit by posting bail money as a favor to a lawyer
who frequented their father's saloon in San Francisco. ' 0 They
began charging a fee for this service and their side business
became a huge success, albeit a notorious one." In fact, the
McDonough brothers' business was so successful that it
earned the nickname of "Old Lady of Kearny Street" who "fur-
nished bail by the gross to bookmakers and prostitutes, kept a
taxi waiting at the door to whisk them out of jail and back to
work."' The brothers inadvertently created America's first bail
bonding business, and thus the commercial money bail indus-
try was bom.
What started as a lucky venture soon spread across the
United States, producing a domino-like effect that transformed
the criminal justice system.13 At first, commercial money bail
simply allowed more defendants to obtain release from jail-it
was a needed service for poor, friendless defendants who ordi-
narily would not have been able to make bail at all. 14 However,
because bondsmen were making it more difficult to keep the
accused behind bars before trial, judges began setting higher
10 See SHIMA BARADARAN BAUGHMAN, THE BAIL BOOK: A COMPREHENSIVE LOOK AT
BAIL IN AMERICA'S CRIMNAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 165 (2018). Peter and Thomas McDon-
ough posted bail money as a favor to lawyers who frequented their father's bar
and when the lawyers' clients appeared in court, the brothers got their money
back. Shane Bauer, Inside the Wild, Shadowy, and Highly Lucrative Bail Industry,
MOTHER JONES (May/June 2014), www.motherjones.com/politics/2014/06/bafl-
bond-prison-industry [https://perma.cc/LQ6S-2DCC].
11 Bauer, supra note 10.
12 Credit: The Old Lady Moves On, TIME (Aug. 18, 1941), content.tirme.com/
time/magazine/article/0,9171,802159,00.html [https: //perma.cc/P8W9-6JE2].




and higher bail amounts.15 Eventually, even defendants who
could not afford the small bail amounts were given high bail
amounts. 16 By the 1940s, bail amounts nationwide were high
enough that many defendants had no choice but to pay a
bondsman or wait in jail until trial. 
17
The commercial bail industry, and the bail system that
became money-based rather than risk-based, became a gate-
way to a wider systemic issue: the cobweb criminal justice
system in America. The web easily entraps and ensnares indi-
viduals who are poor, minorities, or otherwise marginalized in
an endless cycle of crime and punishment. Individuals locked
up for even a few days can lose their jobs, homes, or custody of
their children, leading them into a cycle of crime in order to
survive.1 ' The monetary bail system only exacerbates this cy-
cle, and it has innumerable negative effects on both individual
rights and society as a whole.
The monetary bail system discriminates on the basis of
wealth and turns justice into a "pay-for-play affair" where
wealthy individuals can pay to go free, while indigent defend-
ants are taken from their families and communities. 19 Further,
"detention, rather than other variables, causally affects [trial]
outcomes."20 For instance, defendants who are detained pre-
trial are significantly disadvantaged in court-detained defend-
ants are 25% more likely to be convicted and 43% more likely to
receive jail sentences.2 1 Mass incarceration rates are also af-
fected by the bail system in that "Itihe political pressures of the
criminal justice system reward judges for conservatism in mak-
ing release and punishment decisions,"22 resulting in a trend of
overincarceration of pretrial detainees.
Ultimately, in fewer than fifty years, the bail system
changed from one that was risk-based to one that was wealth-
based without any legislative or policy motivation.23 In the
wake of this change, a cascade of negative consequences fol-




18 See Thea L. Sebastian & Alec Karakatsanis, Challenging Money Bail in the
Courts, 57 JUDGES' J. 23, 23 (2018).
19 Id. at 24.
20 Id.
21 Id.
22 Esmond Harmsworth, Bail and Detention An Assessment and Critique of
the Federal and Massachusetts Systems, 22 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINE-
MENT 213, 220 (1996).
23 See BAUGHMAN, supra note 10, at 167.
[Vol. 104:18671870
INCARCERATION OR E-CARCERATION
figuring out how to change the system back to the way it once
was.
B. Bail Reform in America
1. Federal Reforms
Congress's initial attempt to reform the federal bail system
resulted in the Bail Reform Act of 1966 (1966 Act). The 1966
Act provided defendants with a statutory right to obtain release
on bail.2 4 Congress clearly stated that its purpose of the legis-
lation was, "to assure that all persons, regardless of their finan-
cial status, shall not needlessly be detained pending their
appearance to answer charges, to testify, or pending appeal,
when detention serves neither the ends ofjustice nor the public
interest."2 5 Pretrial bail was not to be used as a means of
protecting society against the "possible commission of addi-
tional crimes by the accused."2 6
The 1970s and 1980s saw a rise in crime rates and a rise in
tough-on-crime legislation.27 This attitude toward crime had a
profound impact on attitudes toward bail, ultimately motivat-
ing Congress to pass the Bail Reform Act of 1984 (1984 Act).28
In passing the 1984 Act, Congress noted its purpose was to
address "the alarming problem of crimes committed by persons
on release."2 9 The 1984 Act essentially revised the 1966 Act to
allow courts to impose conditions of release to ensure commu-
nity safety.30 Specifically, the 1984 Act provided that, "the
judicial officer [must] release the [defendant] on his own recog-
nizance, or upon execution of an unsecured appearance bond
... unless the judicial officer determines that such release will
not reasonably assure the appearance of the person as re-
quired or will endanger the safety of any other person or the
community."31
The 1984 Act expanded the list of factors a judicial officer
could consider in determining whether bail should be set in a
24 Bail Reform Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-465, § 3146, 80 Stat. 214
(amended 1984).
25 H.R. REP. No. 89-1541 (1966), reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2293, 2295.
26 Id.; see BAUGHMAN, supra note 10, at 166.
27 James A. Allen, "Making Bail": Limiting the Use of Bail Schedules and
Defining the Elusive Meaning of "Excessive" Bail, 25 J.L. & POLY 637, 653-55
(2017).
28 Bail Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 202 (codified as 18 U.S.C.
§§ 3141-3150 (1988)); see Allen, supra note 27, at 685.
29 S. REP. No. 98-225, at 3 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3185.
30 See icd
31 Id. at 3195 (emphasis added).
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particular case to include "the nature and seriousness of the
danger to any person or the community that would be posed by
the person's release."32 By allowing the court to consider a
defendant's potential for dangerousness, the 1984 Act added a
rebuttable presumption of preventative detention if a defen-
dant had committed certain offenses like violent crimes or seri-
ous drug crimes.3 3 The 1984 Act permitted courts to deny bail
to defendants as a preventative measure,34 and this arguably
contributed to the growing use of monetary bail in America.
3 5
The 1984 Act came under scrutiny in United States v. Sa-
lerno.3 6 The Salerno Court upheld the constitutionality of the
1984 Act,3 7 and the Court emphasized that preventative deten-
tion must be "regulatory, not penal" and must not constitute
"impermissible punishment before trial."38, Further, the Court
ruled that although the liberty interest of a presumptively inno-
cent arrestee rises to the level of a fundamental constitutional
right, preventative detention can be consistent with constitu-
tional guarantees as long as there are robust procedural safe-
guards.39 These procedural safeguards must protect "the due
process rights of the defendant and result[] in a finding that no
less restrictive condition or combination of conditions can ade-
quately assure the arrestee's appearance in court and/or pro-
tect public safety, thereby demonstrating a compelling state
32 BAUGHMAN, supra note 10, at 166; see also Floralynn Einesman, How Long
is Too Long? When Pretrial Detention Violates Due Process, 60 TENN. L. REV. 1, 1
(1992) (noting that the Bail Reform Act authorized courts to consider a defen-
dant's flight risk and danger to community in setting bail).
33 18 U.S.C. § 3142(b) (2012); see Keith Eric Hansen, When Worlds Collide:
The Constitutional Politics of United States v. Salerno, 14 AM. J. CRIM. L. 155, 158
(1987).
34 Ann M. Overbeck, Detention for the Dangerous: The Bail Reform Act of 1984,
55 U. CIN. L. REv. 153, 169 (1986); see Allen, supra note 27, at 685.
35 See BAUGHMAN, supra note 10, at 166.
36 United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 741 (1987); see Allen, supra note
27, at 685.
37 Salerno, 481 U.S. at 739; see In re Humphrey, 228 Cal. Rptr. 3d 513, 530
(Cal. Ct. App. 2018).
38 Salerno, 481 U.S. at 746; see Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535-39 (1979)
("In evaluating the constitutionality of conditions or restrictions of pretrial deten-
tion that implicate only the protection against deprivation of liberty without due
process of law, we think that the proper inquiry is whether those conditions
amount to punishment of the detainee.... [I]f a particular condition or restriction
of pretrial detention is reasonably related to a legitimate governmental objective, it
does not, without more, amount to 'punishment.'").
39 Salerno, 481 U.S. at 750-51.
[Vol. 104:18671872
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interest warranting abridgment of an arrestee's liberty prior to
trial. "40
In giving judges more factors to consider in the bail deter-
mination process, the 1984 Act sought to provide more reasons
to grant pretrial release. Paradoxically, the additional factors
enunciated in Salerno were not employed by the courts to effec-
tuate more instances of pretrial release. Rather, they were em-
ployed as bases of new, legitimate reasons for ordering pretrial
preventative detention.4 1
2. State Reforms
In recent years, the administration of bail in the criminal
justice system has caused nationwide concern.42 Indeed, "[iln
2017, state lawmakers in 46 states and the District of Colum-
bia enacted 182 new pretrial laws-almost a 50 percent in-
crease compared to 2015 and 2016." 4 3 Many of the pretrial
policy enactments that these state legislators passed dealt with
the use or development of risk assessments in determinations
of bail and release conditions.44 States also "modified who is
eligible for release after arrest" and "amended pretrial release
provisions by limiting the use of financial conditions in release
decisions. "45
The recent trend in bail reform follows in the footsteps of
successful bail reform efforts such as those in Kentucky and
Washington, D.C., where legislation mandated that the bail
system rely on risk assessments rather than money bail.46 In-
40 Humphrey, 228 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 526; see also Salerno, 481 U.S. at 747
("The Bail Reform Act carefully limits the circumstances under which detention
may be sought to the most serious of crimes.").
41 See BAUGHMAN, supra note 10, at 186.
42 PRErRIAL DETENTION REFORM WORKGROUP, PRETRIAL DETENTION REFORM: REC-
OMMENDATIONS TO THE CHIEF JUSTICE 13 (2017); see, e.g., John S. Goldkamp, Judi-
cial Responsibility for Pretrial Release Dectsionmaking and the Information Role of
Pretrial Services, 57 FED. PROBATION 28, 30 (1993) (discussing how "serious ques-
tions about the fairness and effectiveness of pretrial release" still remain even
decades after bail reform went into effect); IMOTHY SCHNACKE, U.S. DEP'T OF JUS-
TICE, FUNDAMENTALS OF BAIL: A RESOURCE GUIDE FOR PRETRIAL PRACTITIONERS AND A
FRAMEWoRK FOR AMERICAN PRETRIAL REFORM 7 (2014) (discussing how recent pretrial
reform initiatives have increased the visibility of the need for bail reform).
43 NAT'L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, TRENDS IN PRETRIAL RELEASE: STATE





46 See Frequently Asked Questions: Pretrial Detention Reform, CALIFORNIA
COURTS: THE JUDICIAL BRANCH OF CALIFORNIA (Nov. 6, 2017), https://newsroom
.courts. ca. gov/news/ frequently-asked- questions-pretrial-detention-reform
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deed, Washington, D.C., has operated an effective and success-
ful pretrial system with almost no money bail for decades.
47 In
other states, such as New Mexico, legal action48 led to new bail
reform efforts.
49
In 2017, New Jersey's Criminal Justice Reform Act
(CJRA)50 instituted "pretrial service agencies to conduct risk
assessments, encourage nonmonetary release, and allow de-
tention without bail for defendants deemed too dangerous or
flight risks."5 1 The legislation also provided for pretrial moni-
toring as a release option.5 2 Since the CJRA's implementation,
judicial officers have almost eliminated the use of monetary
bail.
5 3
In February 2018, one year after the implementation of the
CJRA, the New Jersey Judiciary issued a report to the Gover-
nor and the legislature summarizing the results of the CJRA
and the successes and challenges the CJRA confronted since
[https://perma.cc/9355-34Tr]. In Washington, D.C., defendants are not incar-
cerated pretrial if they cannot afford bail and they are not generally allowed to pay
for release. See D.C. CODE § 23-1321(c)(3) (2016). Kentucky, Washington, D.C.,
and other jurisdictions with robust pretrial programs that do not rely on financial
guarantees also have low failure to appear rates. Frequently Asked Questions:
Pretrial Detention Reform, supra.
47 Having almost entirely eliminated money bail, D.C. releases 94% of defend-
ants pretrial. See Harvard Law Review Ass'n, Bail Reform and Risk Assessment:
The Cautionary Tale of Federal Sentencing, 131 HARv. L. REV. 1125, 1130 (2018).
Further, 90% of defendants released pretrial make their court appointments, and
98% are not rearrested for a violent crime pretrial. Id. These appearance and
public-safety rates both surpass the national average. Id.
48 State v. Brown, 338 P.3d 1276 (N.M. 2014).
49 The New Mexico Supreme Court created a task force to revamp the state's
bail scheme, and this task force later proposed a bail "amendment o the New
Mexico Constitution prohibiting bail above what defendants can afford and ex-
panding the power of judges to hold defendants without bail for dangerousness
and risk of flight." Kenechukwu Okocha, Nationwide Trend: Rethinking the Money
Bail System, 90 WiS. LAw. 30, 34 (2017); see N.M. CONST. art II, § 13. An initiative
to revise the state's constitutional provision addressing bail passed with 87% of
the vote. S.J. Res. 1, 52d Leg., 2d Sess. (N.M. 2016), www.sos.state.nm.us/
uploads/files/CA1-SJM1-2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/W6KE-9UY7]. The initia-
tive provides for preventative detention on grounds of dangerousness or flight risk
under limited circumstances and prohibits detaining a defendant solely due to
financial inability to post a money or property bond. Id.
50 2014 N.J. Sess. Law Serv. Ch. 31 (West).
51 See Okocha, supra note 49, at 34.
52 PRETRIAL DETENTION REFORM WORKGROUP, supra note 42, at 17.
53 See Lisa W. Foderaro, New Jersey Alters Its Ball System and Upends Legal
Landscape, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 6, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/06/
nyregion/new-jersey-bail-system.html [https://perma.cc/A84U-JWBK]; New
Jersey Courts Criminal Justice Reform Information Center, N.J. COURTS, wwW
"judiciary. state.nj' us/courts /criminal/reform.html [https: //perma.cc/RDD8-
MRPAJ (last visited July 30, 2019).
1874
INCARCERATION OR E-CARCERATION
its implementation.54 According to preliminary statistics, the
pretrial jail population experienced a significant decrease, de-
clining from 8,894 pretrial detainees in 2015 to only 5,743 in
2018.5 5 Indeed, in 2017 alone, the pretrial jail population de-
creased 20%.56 Counting the time between 2015 and 2017,
New Jersey's pretrial detainee population has decreased by a
total of 35%.57
C. California's Senate Bill No. 10
In California, approximately two-thirds of the jail popula-
tion-nearly 48,000 people-are unsentenced.58 Further, Cali-
fornia's average bail is $50,000, more than five times the
national average.59 These high bail amounts place an inordi-
nate burden on the poor, given that 47% of Americans lack
even $400 for emergency expenses.60 Further, the bail system
affects California taxpayers, who spend millions of dollars each
day on housing the detainees awaiting trial.61
For decades, criminal justice reform advocates unsuccess-
fully struggled to change the blackhole that was California's
bail system.62 However, in 2017, the bail reform movement
gained a new momentum. In In re Humphrey, the California
Court of Appeals held that the Fourteenth Amendment requires
courts to consider a defendant's ability to pay, nonmonetary
alternatives to money bail, and less restrictive conditions of
release before ordering pretrial detention.63 The court stated
that because the trial court set bail at an amount that was
impossible for Humphrey to pay, despite having found him
suitable for release on bail, the trial court's order constituted a
54 GLENN A. GRANT, 2017 REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR AND THE LEGISLATURE 1
(2017), https: / /www.njcourts.gov/courts/assets/criminal/20 1 7cjrannual.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8HMV-TAMV].
55 IL at 19.
56 Id.
57 Id.
58 The Board of State and Community Corrections' annual Jail Profile Survey
includes both people who are eligible for release but have not (or cannot) post
money bail, and people who are not eligible for release. SB 10: Pretrial Release
and Detention, CALIFORNIA COURTS: THE JUDICIAL BRANCH OF CALIFORNIA, https://
www.courts.ca.gov/pretrial.htm [https: / /perma.cc/S9PZ-QD38] (last visited July
30, 2019) (under "What percentage of the people held in California jails are un-
sentenced?" in "Frequently Asked Questions").
59 Kyle Harrison, SB 10: Punishment Before Conviction? Alleviating Economic
Injustice in California with Bail Reform, 49 U. PAC. L. REV. 533, 535 (2018).
60 Id. at 537-38.
61 Id. at 535.
62 See id. at 539.
63 In re Humphrey, 228 Cal. Rptr. 3d 513, 517 (Cal. Ct. App. 2018).
2019] 1875
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"sub rosa detention order lacking the due process protections
constitutionally required."64
The Humphrey court also referenced the Pretrial Detention
Reform Workgroup's report,65 which concluded that, "Califor-
nia's current pretrial release and detention system unnecessa-
rily compromises victim and public safety because it bases a
person's liberty on financial resources rather than the likeli-
hood of future criminal behavior and exacerbates socioeco-
nomic disparities and racial bias."6 6 The substance of the
report consists of ten recommendations designed to establish
and facilitate implementation of
a risk-based pretrial assessment and supervision system
that (1) gathers individualized information so that courts can
make release determinations based on whether a defendant
poses a threat to public safety and is likely to return to
court-without regard for the defendant's financial situation;
and (2) provides judges with release options that are effective,
varied, and fair alternatives to monetary ball.
6 7
Ultimately, the Humphrey opinion and the Pretrial Detention
Reform Workgroup's report became the blueprint for a new
wave of bail reform, and with the passage of SB 10, California
became the first state to completely abolish its cash bail
system.68
II
LEGAL AND POLICY CHALLENGES TO SB 10
Notwithstanding SB 10's laudatory goal to reform a dis-
criminatory system of bail, the legislation has produced
staunch critics, even from some unanticipated sources.69
Chief among the SB 10 critics, and not unexpectedly, is the bail
bond industry. The bail bond industry is worth $2 billion,
70
and facing the existential threat that SB 10 poses, bail bonds-
64 Id. at 517 (emphasis in original).
65 Id. at 516; see PRETRIAL DETENTION REFORM WORKGROUP, supra note 42.
66 PRETRIAL DETENTION REFORM WORKGROUP, supra note 42, at 1.
67 Id. at 2.
68 Fuller, supra note 6.
69 See Lorelei Laird, ABA Weighs in on California Supreme Court Case Affect-
ing State's New Bail Reform Law, AM. BAR ASS'N J. (Oct. 10, 2018), http://www
.abajournal.com/news/article/bail_reformers-critcal of californiabal_reform_
law [https://perma.cc/GCJ2-KJSK] (noting that critics include the bail industry,
public defenders, prosecutors, and criminal justice reformers).
70 Jazmlne Ulloa, California's Historic Overhaul of Cash Bail Is Now on Hold,





men have declared that "[elvery single weapon in [their] arsenal
will be fired" in order to block the law.7 1
A. Legal Challenges to SB 10
Senate Bill 10 opponents challenge the law's inclusion of
preventative detention on the grounds that it violates the con-
stitutional right to bail.7 2 Although the U.S. Constitution does
not explicitly provide for a constitutional right to bail, case law
leaves some room for argument regarding this ambiguity.




The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Consti-
tution guarantee that "[no State shall... deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law."74 Relying
on the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, critics argue that
pretrial detention deprives a person of their liberty and there-
fore violates the constitutional right to bail.7 5 However, in or-
der to find that the right to bail is fundamental to due process,
the Court must first find that the right is "deeply rooted in this
Nation's history and tradition" and "fundamental to our con-
cept of constitutionally ordered liberty."76 In this context, the
Supreme Court declined to decide whether the right to bail
satisfies this standard,7 7 leaving the issue open for determina-
71 Laird, supra note 69.
72 See Fuller, supra note 6.
73 As of 2009, forty-one state constitutions guaranteed the right to bail. Ar-
ana Lindermayer, What the Right Hand Gives: Prohibitive Interpretations of the
State Constitutional Right to Bail, 78 FORDHAM L. REv. 267, 283-84 (2009). How-
ever, courts differ in their interpretations about whether state provisions protect-
tng the right to bail are absolute or conditional. See id. at 274, 276 ("[Sleveral
state constitutions only prohibit excessive ball without guaranteeing any right to
bail. A majority of states, however, have adopted stronger protections than those
secured by federal law, by guaranteeing a constitutional right to bail in noncapital
cases." (footnote omitted)).
74 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; see U.S. CONST. amend. V.
75 See California: Assembly Passes Senate Bill 10 "Bail Reform," the Unconsti-
tutional "Crappy Bill," AM. BAIL COALITION (Aug. 20, 2018), http://www.american
bailcoalition.org/in-the-news/california-assembly-passes-senate-bfll- 10-ball-re-
form-the-unconstitutional-crappy-bil/ [https://perma.cc/5P5L-EDB8] ("Califor-
nians have a 'right to bail' and that's something no Assembly vote can change.").
76 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721, 727 (1997) (emphasis
added).
77 United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 752-53 (1987); Stack v. Boyle, 342
U.S. 1, 4 (1951) (stating that unless the right to bail is preserved, "the presump-
tion of innocence, secured only after centuries of struggle, would lose its mean-
20191 1877
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
tion in the future.78 This ambiguity poses a potential problem
for SB 10: does a bail reform law abolishing monetary bail
infringe on a constitutional right to bail?
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals dealt with a due process
challenge to a piece of bail reform legislation.
79 Holland v. Ro-
sen is a putative class action brought by a bail bond company
and a defendant subject to the pretrial release conditions of
home detention and electronic monitoring after being charged
with aggravated assault.8 0 The plaintiffs contended that the
CJRA violated the Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amend-
ments by failing to allow defendants to provide cash bail as an
alternative to nonmonetary release conditions.
8 1 The Holland
court rejected Holland's procedural due process argument
under the Fourteenth Amendment. In response to this chal-
lenge, the court noted that the CJRA includes (1) all of the
"extensive safeguards" of the federal Bail Reform Act, which the
Supreme Court held were more than constitutionally sufficient
in Salerno, and (2) "the additional protection of extensive dis-
covery" prior to the pretrial detention hearing, which the fed-
eral process did not provide.8 2 The Holland court also rejected
the substantive due process challenge, holding that Holland
did not adequately show that the rights to cash bail and corpo-
rate surety bond were deeply rooted in the nation's history and
tradition.8 3 In its opinion, the court explained that the original
meaning of "bail" encompassed only a personal surety bail sys-
tem,8 4 and that
cash bail and corporate surety bond are not protected by
substantive due process because they are neither sufficiently
rooted historically nor implicit in the concept of ordered lib-
erty. Hence the [CJRA's] subordination of monetary bail to
non-monetary conditions of release need only be rationally
related to a legitimate State interest. And it is-New Jersey's
interests in ensuring defendants appear in court, do not en-
ing"); Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 544-46 (1952) (holding that the Eighth
Amendment does not guarantee a right to bail in all arrests).
78 The criminal justice system extols the principle that individuals are pre-
sumed innocent until proven guilty. See Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432,
459 (1895). While the Supreme Court has avoided the question of whether there
is a fundamental right to bail, it has held that bail is not guaranteed in all arrests,
suggesting that there is no fundamental right to bail. See Carlson, 342 U.S. at
544-46.
79 Holland v. Rosen, 895 F.3d 272 (3d Cir. 2018).
80 Id- at 284.
81 Id at 278.
82 Id at 298-99.
83 Id at 295-96.
84 Id. at 289.
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danger the safety of any person or the community, or ob-
struct their criminal process, are no doubt legitimate.8 5
The Third Circuit's clear ruling rejecting the idea that bail is a
fundamental right dashes any hopes bail advocates may have
about invalidating bail reform legislation by way of substantive
due process. Furthermore, on October 29, 2018, the Supreme
Court denied certiorari, guaranteeing that the Third Circuit's
ruling would be the last word on the case.8 6 In light of this
denial, it appears unlikely that the Supreme Court will ever
choose to make a definitive ruling on the issue. Further, the
Supreme Court's denial of certiorari and the Third Circuit's
rejection of Holland's due process challenges show that a due
process challenge to SB 10 is not likely to be raised, nor is it
likely to be successful.
2. Eighth Amendment "Excessive Bail" Clause
The Eighth Amendment provides "[e]xcessive bail shall not
be required."8 7 Opponents to SB 10 will likely argue that the
Excessive Bail Clause provides a constitutional right to bail.
However, there is a rigorous debate as to whether the Excessive
Bail Clause incorporates a "right to bail" inherent in its pro-
scription of excessive bail.s 8 Further, even assuming the
Eighth Amendment does provide a right to bail, no court has
yet determined whether that right extends to monetary bail to
be considered in line with nonmonetary release conditions.8 9
As such, given these ambiguities, an Eighth Amendment chal-
lenge to SB 10 is not likely to be successful.
In determining whether the Eighth Amendment provides a
right to bail, a court first has to determine the definition of
"excessive" bail; however, the Supreme Court has yet to define
"excessiveness."90 The Supreme Court jurisprudence regard-
85 Id. at 296.
86 Holland v. Rosen, 139 S. Ct. 440 (2018).
87 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
88 The majority of courts facing Eighth Amendment challenges to preventative
detention have concluded that the Excessive Bail Clause does not grant an abso-
lute right to bail. Overbeck, supra note 34, at 192. However, a few courts have
held that the Eighth Amendment guarantees a right to bail. Kevin F. Arthur,
Preventive Detention: Liberty in the Balance, 46 MD. L. REV. 378, 394 (1987); see,
e.g., Escandar v. Ferguson, 441 F. Supp. 53, 58 (S.D. Fla. 1977) (discussing how
denying pretrial release implicates a defendant's fundamental rights); Trimble v.
Stone, 187 F. Supp. 483, 484-85 (D.D.C. 1960) ("The right to bail pending trial is
absolute, except in capital cases .... ").
89 Holland, 895 F.3d at 288.
90 Samuel R. Wiseman, Pretrial Detention and the Right to be Monitored, 123
YALE L. J. 1344, 1349 (2014).
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ing the Excessive Bail Clause is sparse and consists chiefly of
two cases: Stack v. Boyle91 and Carlson v. Landon.
92 In Stack,
the Court rejected an excessive bail amount set for the purpose
of preventing defendants from receiving bail.
93 Although the
Court defended the historic meaning of bail in Stack, it took an
opposite view in Carlson v. Landon, holding that the Eighth
Amendment does not guarantee a right to bail in all cases.
94
Left with these conflicting rulings, the Eighth Amendment has
not been a fruitful constitutional provision with which to chal-
lenge bail.95
Further, the weakness of an Eighth Amendment argument
to a bail reform law can be seen in Holland v. Rosen, which
involved an Eighth Amendment challenge to New Jersey's
CJRA.9 6 Holland argued that the Eighth Amendment's prohibi-
tion against excessive bail implicitly encompassed a right to
monetary bail.97 The Third Circuit, in rejecting this argument,
noted that (1) the concepts of cash bail or corporate security
bonds did not exist when the Eighth Amendment was en-
acted,9 8 and (2) the modem understanding of "bail" developed
in the twentieth century would include not only monetary bail,
but also nonmonetary conditions imposed under the CJRA that
"enable[ I accused persons 'to stay out of jail until a trial has
found them guilty.' ' 99 To pass muster under the Eighth
Amendment, nonmonetary conditions, like monetary bail,
must not be "excessive in light of the perceived evil."
100 Noting
that (1) the CJRA expressly required trial judges in New Jersey
to impose the least restrictive conditions possible to achieve its
goals, and (2) only "8.3% of eligible defendants" were subjected
to "level 3+ home detention and electronic monitoring," the
Third Circuit found no indication that the nonmonetary condi-
tions imposed on Holland or other eligible defendants were
"excessive."l01
91 342 U.S. 1, 4 (1951).
92 342 U.S. 524, 544-46 (1952).
93 Stack, 342 U.S. at 7.
94 Carlson, 342 U.S. at 544-46.
95 See Wiseman, supra note 90, at 1349.
96 Holland v. Rosen, 895 F.3d 272, 278 (3d Cir. 2018).
97 I& at 285.
98 Id. at 290.
99 Id.
100 Id. at 291 (quoting United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 754 (1987)).
101 Id at 291-92.
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3. State Constitutional Right to Bail
The California Constitution contains two sections pertain-
ing to bail: Article I, sections 12 and 28(f)(3).102 These two
sections govern pretrial release on bail and personal recogni-
zance release.10 3 Few cases have addressed these constitu-
tional provisions, and as a result, no definitive judicial
interpretation exists regarding the differences between these
two provisions.'0 4 However, it is clear that the state constitu-
tion prohibits excessive bail. 1
0 5
Section 12 of the California Constitution states that "[a]
person shall be released on bail by sufficient sureties," with few
offenses as exceptions.10 6 Section 12 "was intended to abro-
gate the common law rule that bail was a matter of judicial
discretion by conferring an absolute right to bail except in a
narrow class of cases."107 This provision
establishes a person's right to obtain release on bail from
pretrial custody, identifies certain categories of crime in
which such bail is unavailable, prohibits the imposition of
excessive bail as to other crimes, sets forth the factors a court
shall take into consideration in fixing the amount of the re-
quired bail, and recognizes that a person 'may be released on
his or her own recognizance in the court's discretion."0 8
102 CAL. CONST. art. I, §§ 12, 28(f)(3).
103 California constitutional and statutory rights to bail are broader than fed-
eral rights. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1271 (West 1872); see also In re Underwood,
508 P.2d 721, 725 (1973) ("lilt is clear that the Constitution of California prohibits
the denial of bail solely because of petitioner's dangerous propensities.").
104 PRETR1AL DETENTION REFORM WORKGROUP, supra note 42, at 20.
105 CAL. CONSr. art. I, §§ 12, 28(f)(3). Bail is not considered excessive merely
because the defendant cannot post it. Galen v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 477 F.3d 652,
661 (9th Cir. 2007); Exparte Bumette, 95 P.2d 684, 684-85 (Cal. Ct. App. 1939).
However, bail may not be set in an amount which is functionally no bail in a case
where bail is mandated. Galen, 477 F.3d at 661. The amount of bail may not be
set solely to ensure the defendant's incarceration for improper reasons. See
Wagenmann v. Adams, 829 F.2d 196, 213 (1st Cir. 1987).
106 CAL. CONST. art. I, § 12. The offenses excluded from receiving bail are capi-
tal crimes and felony offenses involving acts of violence or sexual assault, both
where the facts are evident or the presumption of guilt is great. Id. Another
exception is any felony offense where the defendant has threatened another with
great bodily harm and there is a substantial likelihood that the threat would be
carried out if the person were released. Id.
107 In re Humphrey, 228 Cal. Rptr. 3d 513, 523 (Cal. Ct. App. 2018) (citations
omitted).
108 Id. (quoting In re York, 892 P.2d 804, 807 (1995)). Section 12 provides in
flill:
"A person shall be released on bail by sufficient sureties, except for:
(a) Capital crimes when the facts are evident or the presump-
tion great;
(b) Felony offenses involving acts of violence on another person,
or felony sexual assault offenses on another person, when
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Section 28 establishes and ensures enforcement of certain
rights for victims of criminal acts, 10 9 one of which is the right
"[tlo have the safety of the victim and the victim's family consid-
ered in fixing the amount of bail and release conditions for the
defendant."1 0 With respect to that victim's right, Section
28(f)(3), entitled "Public Safety Bail," provides that "[iln setting,
reducing or denying bail, . .. [plublic safety and the safety of
the victim shall be the primary considerations.""'
These sections of the California Constitution may pose the
greatest legal threat to SB 10's survival. Notably, as SB 10
eliminates cash bail, the law may be challenged on the grounds
that it violates the California Constitution's guarantee to an
"absolute right to bail except in a narrow class of cases."
1' 12
Indeed, members of the bail industry have already suggested
this by claiming that SB 10 infringes on the state constitution's
positive right to bail. 113 The best way to dodge such a chal-
lenge is by amending the state constitution. One state did just
that in order to protect its bail reform law-New Jersey
amended its constitution as a necessary addition to its enact-
ment of the CJRA. 114 New Jersey voters ultimately passed a
constitutional amendment permitting the detention of high-
the facts are evident or the presumption great and the court
finds based upon clear and convincing evidence that there is
a substantial likelihood the person's release would result in
great bodily harm to others; or
(c) Felony offenses when the facts are evident or the presump-
tion great and the court finds based on clear and convincing
evidence that the person has threatened another with great
bodily harm and that there is a substantial likelihood that
the person would carry out the threat if released.
Excessive bail may not be required. In fixing the amount of bail, the
court shall take into consideration the seriousness of the offense
charged, the previous criminal record of the defendant, and the
probability of his or her appearing at the trial or hearing of the case.
A person may be released on his or her own recognizance in the
court's discretion."
CAL. CONST. art. I, § 12.
109 CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28(b).
110 Id. § 28(b)(3).
111 Id. § 28(f)(3).
112 Humphrey, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 523 (citations omitted).
113 Blanca Garcia, Bail Industry Fights SB 10, SANTA BARBARA INDEPENDENT (Oct.
11, 2018), https: / /www.independent. com/news/2018/oct/I 1/bail-industry-
fights-sb- 10/ [https://perma.cc/VY5X-N49E].
114 Prior to the CJRA's implementation, the New Jersey Constitution man-
dated the right to bail for a!l defendants, creating a paradoxical system where the
state's wealth-based bail system and the state constitution's right to bail were in
direct conflict. THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE, REPORT OF THE JOINT
COMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE 2 (2014).
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risk defendants before trial.115 In a similar vein, the biggest
step in support of SB 10 would be to follow New Jersey's exam-
ple and enact an amendment to the California Constitution to
bring its bail provision in line with that of the Federal
Constitution. 
116
B. Policy Challenges to SB 10
While legal challenges to the validity of SB 10 may not pose
a danger to the law's survival, policy challenges headed by the
media and driven by the bail bondsman lobby pose a much
bigger threat. Further, despite SB 10's passage, California vot-
ers will weigh in on the future of SB 10.117 A coalition called
Californians Against the Reckless Bail Scheme1 18 attained
enough signatures to qualify for a referendum for the Novem-
ber 2020 ballot.119 As such, SB 10 is placed on hold until
2020, giving the bail industry and other opponents more than a
year to stop SB 10 for good. 120 The bail industry is not the only
opponent to SB 10-other critics include public defenders,
12 1
115 S. Con. Res. 128, 216th Leg. (N.J. 2014), www.njleg.state.nj.us/2014/
Bills/SCR/128_I1.htm [https://perma.cc/F49Y-TJJ3]. The amendment was
passed in November 2014, three months after the passage of the CJRA. See New
Jersey Pretrial Detention Amendment, Public Question No. 1 (2014), BALLOTPEDIA,
https: //ballotpedia.org/NewJerseyPretrialDetentionAmendment, Public_
Question No. 1_(2014)#citenote-text-2 [https: //perma.cc/3J2V-AB59] (last vis-
ited Sept. 13, 2019).
116 The California Constitution provides that an amendment may be brought
by public initiative or by referendum. CAL. CONST. art. XVIII, §§ 2, 3.
117 Bryan Anderson & Alexei Koseff, Vacant Governor's Mansion + Bail Mea-
sure Has the Votes + California Priorities Summit Today, SACRAMENTO BEE (Nov. 9,
2018, 5:45 AM), https://www.sacbee.com/news/politics-government/capitol-
alert/article221389490.html [https: //perma.cc/MCT5-RYM4].
118 Michael McGough, The Fate of California's Cash Bail Industry Will Now Be
Decided on the 2020 Ballot, SACRAMENTO BEE (Jan. 17, 2019, 12:04 PM), https://
www.sacbee.com/news/state/calfornia/article224682595.html [https://perma
.cc/9FS2-GWWY] ("We knew with the momentum against [SB 10] from people on
all sides of the issue, getting on the ballot would not be the problem,' Jeff Clayton,
executive director of the American Bail Coalition, said in a prepared statement.
'Now we can move on toward defeating this reckless law.'")
119 Anderson & Koseff, supra note 117; Garcia, supra note 113. "[A] referen-
dum asks [California voters] whether they want to overturn a statute written by
lawmakers. The bail industry would be asking voters to cast a 'no' vote on the
ultimate ballot measure to ensure [SB 10's] defeat." Jazmine Ulloa, Bail Bond
Industry Moves to Block Sweeping California Law, Submitting Signature for a 2020
Ballot Referendum, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 20, 2018), https://www.latimes.com/polit
ics/la-pol-ca-bail-referendum-signatures-20 181120-story.html [https://
perma.cc/NY79-6RDL].
120 Anderson & Koseff, supra note 117.
121 Scott Wilson, California Abolishes Cash Bail, Aiming to Treat Rich and Poor
Defendants Equally, WASH. POST (Aug. 29, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost
.com/national/california-abolishes-cash-bail-aiming-to-treat-rich-and-poor-de-
fendants-equally/2018/08/29/70891 a9e-abad- 1 le8-b 1 da-ff7faa6807 1 0story
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the ACLU of California,12 2 Human Rights Watch,12 3 and
lawmakers on both sides of the political spectrum.1 2 4 Their
opposition to SB 10 spans a range of arguments and poses
some important questions as to SB 10's underlying policies.
1. Is SB 10's Judicial Discretion to Detain and
Presumption of Detention Overly Broad?
The original version of SB 10 stated its intent was to "safely
reduce the number of people detained pretrial, while address-
ing racial and economic disparities in the pretrial system."'
2 5
However, the amended SB 10 states only that its intent is to
"permit preventive detention of pretrial defendants."126 This
change in SB 10 has sparked criticism that SB 10 uses broad
language to create a system where judges have nearly unlim-
ited discretion in ordering accused people to be held in prevent-
ative detention until their case is resolved. 12 7 For instance, the
ACLU of California argues that SB 10 "seeks to replace the
current deeply-flawed system with an overly broad presump-
tion of preventative detention." 12 8 This presumption is particu-
larly overbroad when prosecutors are allowed to rely on
hearsay at detention hearings.129 Essentially, the fear is that
SB 10 will shift the burden to defendants, rather than prose-
.html?noredirect=on&utmterm= .28cb424391a3 [https://perma.cc/S28F-
KECZ].
122 ACLU of California Changes Position to Oppose Bail Reform Legislation
ACLU NORTHERN CAL. (Aug. 20, 2018), https://www.aclunc.org/news/aclu-cali-
fornia-changes-position- oppose-bail-reform-legislation [https: //perma.cc/T3YX-
PDV9].
123 Jasmine Tyler & John Raphling, Human Rights Watch Opposes California
Senate Bill 10, The California Bail Reform Act, HUM. RrS. WATCH (Aug. 14, 2018,
9:00 AM), https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/08/14/human-rights-watch-op-
poses- california- senate-bill- 1 0-california-bail-reform-act [https://perma.cc/
9XFX-7N94].
124 State Senate candidate Shannon Grove, in opposition to SB 10, stated, "If
you can't afford bail, don't commit a crime." Jessica Weston & Christopher Liv-
ingston, Grove, Fong Rally for Reform at Republican Women Luncheon, DAILY INDE-
PENDENT (Oct. 24, 2018, 12:01 AM), http://www.ridgecrestca.com/news/201810
24/grove-fong-rally-for-reform-at-republican-women-luncheon [https://perma
.cc/MC6W-RL62]. Additionally, 34th District California Assemblyman Vince Fong
stated in reference to SB 10, "[Wlhen it comes to public safety, when it comes to
our business climate, the things that are coming out of Sacramento are not
making it better." Id.
125 California Money Bail Reform Act, S.B. 10, 2017 Leg., 2017-18 Sess. § 2
(Dec. 5, 2016) (amended on Sept. 6. 2017); Tyler & Raphling, supra note 123.
126 California Money Ball Reform Act, S.B. 10, 2017 Leg., 2017-18 Sess. § 1
(Cal. 2018) (enacted) (codified at CAL. GOV'T CODE § 27771).
127 Tyler & Raphling, supra note 123.
128 ACLU of California Changes Position to Oppose Bail Reform Legislation,
supra note 122.
129 See Tyler & Raphling, supra note 123.
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cutors, to prove that they should be released, regardless of risk
scores. 130 However, these claims are a vast overstatement of
SB 10's mandate.
Under SB 10, at arraignment, defendants-even those
deemed to be high-risk individuals-will never be held in pre-
ventative detention unless certain motions are made and
granted by the court. 131 First, the prosecution must file a mo-
tion for preventative detention. 132 For the judge to even order
that the defendant be held in detention pending that detention
hearing, the judge must determine that there is a "substantial
likelihood that no nonmonetary condition or combination of
conditions of pretrial supervision will reasonably . . . assure
public safety."133 Determining whether there is a substantial
likelihood is an incredibly high standard to satisfy. However, if
the judge does order preventative detention during that period,
the detention hearing must be held within three days of the
motion. 134
Second, the court may order the defendant into prevent-
ative detention only if the judge finds "by clear and convincing
evidence that no nonmonetary condition or combination of
conditions of pretrial supervision will reasonably assure public
safety or the appearance of the defendant in court as re-
quired."135 This determination requires a judge to find that
every nonmonetary condition of release and every combination
of conditions of release is insufficient in assuring the public
safety or the defendant's appearance in court. This is an in-
credibly difficult determination to make and would require sig-
nificant time, money, and effort on behalf of the prosecution.
As such, to order preventative detention, the judge not only
has to reject every single condition of release for the defendant,
but the judge also has to make this determination by "clear and
convincing evidence," a very high evidentiary legal standard to
satisfy. As such, the fear should not be that there is an overly
broad presumption of detention that defendants must rebut,
130 See Max Rivlin-Nadler, California Could Soon End Money Bail, But at What
Cost?, APPEAL (Aug. 22, 2018), https://theappeal.org/calfornila-could-soon-end-
money-bail-but-at-what-cost/ [https: //perma.cc/JZR8-653A].
131 CAL. DEP'T OF FIN., SB 10 GENERAL OVERVIEW 1 (2018), https://www.courts
.ca.gov/documents/sb 10-overview.pdf [https://perma.cc/MUZ8-W8FT].
132 California Money Bail Reform Act (Senate Bill No. 10), CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 1320.18(a) (West 2019) (effective Oct. 1, 2019).
133 Id. § 1320.18(d) (emphasis added).
134 See id. § 1320.19(a). In the detention hearing, the defendant has a right to
counsel and a right to testify. Id. § 1320.19(d). Additionally, the victim must be
notified and provided with an opportunity for input. See id. § 1320.19(e).
135 Id. § 1320.20(d)(1).
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but rather that the possibility of releasing dangerous, high-risk
defendants on conditions of release will rise significantly. SB
10 only creates a presumption of preventative detention-
which is still rebuttable-for a defendant under specific circum-
stances, such as if the crime is a violent felony or the defendant
is deemed a high-risk to public safety. 136 Further, if the court
orders preventative detention, the judge must state the reasons
for ordering preventative detention on the record. 137 This re-
quirement not only creates a transparent record of the judge's
decision, but it also makes it easier for defendants to appeal
the judge's preventative detention decision later on.
Ultimately, the claim that SB 10 creates an overly broad
presumption of detention that every accused person must com-
bat is an alarmist claim resulting from exaggeration and fear-
mongering. SB 10 is not attempting to give judges unlimited
discretion in ordering preventative detention left and right.
Rather, the law creates a carefully constructed legal process,
with multiple safeguards and high hurdles, for ordering pre-
ventative detention: the prosecution must take the time and
effort to file a motion for preventative detention, a detention
hearing must be held in a timely manner, and a judge must
find that the state overcame the high "clear and convincing"
evidentiary standard in proving that no nonmonetary condi-
tions of release, or combinations thereof, would reasonably as-
sure public safety or the defendant's appearance in court.
2. Is the Cost of Implementing and Funding PAS Too
High?
SB 10 establishes Pretrial Assessment Services (PAS), a
program that is tasked with gathering information and using
reports to aid judges in determining whether a defendant is a
136 See id. § 1320.20(d)(1). There is a rebuttable presumption of detention if:
(1) The current crime is a violent felony... or was a felony offense
committed with violence against a person, threatened violence, or
with a likelihood of serious bodily injury, or one in which the defen-
dant was personally armed with or personally used a deadly weapon
or firearm in the commission of the crime, or ... personally inflicted
great bodily njury in the commission of the crime.
Id. § 1320.20(a)(1); or (2) The person was assessed as high risk to public safety;
and a) "was convicted of a serious or violent felony... within the past 5 years"; b)
the defendant is pending sentencing on a serious or violent crime; c) the person
has "intimidated, dissuaded, or threatened" the victim with retaliation; or d) the
person "was on any form of postconviction supervision" except informal proba-
tion. Id. § 1320.20(a)(2).
137 Id. § 1320.20(d)(1).
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public-safety risk or a flight risk.138 PAS also recommends
conditions of release as alternatives to pretrial detention. How-
ever, judges are not bound by the reports and recommenda-
tions of the PAS. Instead, PAS reports serve as tools to inform a
judge's pretrial detention decision. Judicial officers still have
the ability to override the PAS recommendation, if necessary. In
the previous bail system, judges were the final authority in the
determination of pretrial release or pretrial detention. Under
SB 10, judges have similar authority, but they are given a
broader toolkit to use in making this decision. The role of PAS
in supervising and monitoring released defendants simply en-
courages judges to impose conditions of release rather than
preventative detention. As such, the implementation process of
PAS is essential in order for PAS to effectively carry out its role.
In order to adequately implement PAS, the program must
be sufficiently researched, adequately funded, and carefully
supervised. California's SB 10 should generally model its im-
plementation of SB 10 on New Jersey's CJRA. The CJRA's
implementation process took a multiple-pronged approach: it
focused on updating courtroom technology, creating pretrial
service agencies to supervise defendants released pretrial, in-
creasing court filing fees to cover the costs of the program,
educating the public about the legislation, and training the
different participants in the criminal justice system about their
new roles in the administration of pretrial justice. 13 9 In addi-
tion, New Jersey courtroom officials traveled to several jurisdic-
tions in Arizona, Kentucky, Pennsylvania, and Colorado to
learn more about using risk assessment tools within the bail
system. 140 To perfect the risk assessment tool prior to its wide-
spread dissemination, the New Jersey Judiciary validated the
risk assessment instrument by using data from hundreds of
thousands of cases and by testing the tool in a handful of
counties. 141 The judiciary then made minor adjustments to the
instrument based on these experiences. 14 2
California should follow New Jersey's procedures in imple-
menting SB 10. However, in order to carry out a similar pro-
138 SB 10: Pretrial Release and Detention, supra note 58 (under "Does SB 10,
the pretrial reform legislation, mean a judge has less discretion to decide who to
detain or release before trial?" in "Frequently Asked Questions").
139 GLENN A. GRANT, CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORM: REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR AND
LEGISLATURE 1-2 (2015), https://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/courts/assets/crimi
nal/2015cjrarmual.pdf [https://perma.cc/5CMU-DE5R].
140 Id. at 3.




cess of research and testing, California's PAS and judiciary
must first be adequately funded. It is at this point that bail
reform opponents often interject with righteous pleas on behalf
of the taxpayers of California.14 3 However, these concerns
about funding are heavily exaggerated and overblown. In fact,
pretrial services have been estimated to cost as little as $3 per
day, while the cost of pretrial detention is as much as $85 per
day. 144 In Santa Clara County, California, which already uses
a pretrial services program, pretrial services cost around $7
million per year, but the county has saved around $60 million
from no longer detaining unconvicted defendants. 145 As such,
it is clear that conditions of release, such as reminders of court
dates and programs allowing defendants to notify the court of
illness or emergency preventing appearance, are more cost-
effective than imposing pretrial detention. 146
Currently, California spends more than $12 billion per
year on state prisons, a 500% increase in prison spending since
1981 that surpasses spending on education, health, and all
other budget items. 147 Thus, it is clear that allocating funds to
pretrial services, rather than prisons and pretrial detention of
defendants, would save millions in taxpayer money in the long
run. However, this fact will likely do nothing to stop bail reform
opponents from launching vehement opposition campaigns. 148
143 See Garcia, supra note 113.
144 Whittney Evans, Virginia Might Be the Next State to Challenge Controversial
Cash Bail System, COMMUNITY IDEA STATIONS (Oct. 22, 2018), https://www.ideasta-
tions. org/radio/news/virginia-might-be-next-state-challenge-controversial-
cash-bail-system [https: //perma.cc/UB9Y-MRNN].
145 Hanrison, supra note 59, at 542.
146 See Harmsworth, supra note 22, at 222. In one study, the Manhattan Bail
Project mailed letters to the defendants in their native language to remind them of
court dates, resulting in the extremely low 1.6% FTA (failure to appear) rate for
Baltimore. See id. (citing Charles E. Ares et al., The Manhattan Bail Project: An
Interim Report on the Use of Pretrial Parole, 38 N.Y.U. L. REV. 67, 75 (1963) and
Mitchell P. Pines, An Answer to the Problem of Bail: A Proposal in Need of Empirical
Confirmation, 9 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 394, 425 (1973)).
147 Lenore Anderson, If California Wants Real Criminal Justice Reform, This is
the Next Step, SACRAMENTO BEE (Oct. 24, 2018), https://www.sacbee.com/ opin-
ion/california-forum/article220511650.html [https://perma.cc/2GJV-34CA].
148 For example, in opposition to New Jersey's CJRA, the American Bail Coali-
tion paid researchers at Towson University $25,000 to conduct a study on the
costs of the CJRA, with a specific focus on the pretrial services unit created under
the law. Joe Hemandez, Who Is Losing Out Under New Jersey's Criminal Justice
Changes? Bail Bondsmen, WHYY (Dec. 29, 2016), https://whyy.org/articles/who-
is-losing-out-under-new-jerseys-criminal-justice-reforms-bail-bondsmen/
[https://perma.cc/S4AW-PN3K]. The report, published in 2014, estimated that
the CJRA would cost almost $66 million in its first year. However, the Towson
study was "requested and paid for by the bail bond industry," leading to questions
about the dubious incentives of the study's funders. Id. Similar vehement oppo-
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Ultimately, an adequately funded PAS is crucial to the suc-
cess of SB 10's bail reform efforts and to the administration of
nonmonetary release conditions as an alternative to prevent-
ative detention. Despite the implementation and start-up costs
that PAS will inevitably require, the use of pretrial services is
more cost-effective than not using them. As such, the long-
term financial outlook favors the use of pretrial services despite
the implementation costs necessary to start such services.
3. Are the Risk Assessments in SB 10 Discriminatory?
Under SB 10, within twelve hours of booking, the booking
agency, usually the sheriff, will release defendants arrested for
misdemeanors (with some exceptions for domestic violence,
stalking, and other serious factors).149 Within twenty-four
hours of booking, PAS will assess all individuals who have not
been released by the booking agency-defendants charged with
felonies or with misdemeanors where, under an exception, they
cannot be released on recognizance. 150 PAS will conduct "pre-
arraignment reviews" for these individuals using a validated
risk assessment instrument, and PAS will inform the booking
agency of eligible low-risk and medium-risk individuals who
may be immediately released without a court appearance.15 1
Individuals who are assessed as high-risk must be held until
arraignment (within forty-eight hours of arrest). 152 Release de-
cisions for these individuals will be made by the court. 153 Prior
to arraignment, PAS will provide risk assessment information
and other information to the courts, including any recommen-
dations for conditions of release. 154 Courts may choose to per-
form their own pre-arraignment review under certain
enumerated circumstances. 155 If courts choose this route, ju-
dicial officers may order the release of additional low- and me-
dium-risk defendants prior to arraignment after receiving
information from PAS, including the results of a risk
assessment. 156
sition campaigns can be expected to arise in response to SB 10. However, the
likelihood of success of such campaigns is unclear, depending largely on the
public's perception of SB 10.
149 California Money Bail Reform Act (Senate Bill No. 10), CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 1320.8 (West 2019) (effective October 1, 2019).
150 See id. § 1320.9(a).
151 See id. § 1320.10(a)-(c).
152 See id. § 1320.10(e).
153 See id.
154 See id. § 1320.9.




Given SB 10's reliance on risk assessments, concerns have
been raised about these validated risk assessment instru-
ments, which may consider factors such as race and other
demographic factors that have the ability to inappropriately
affect risk assessment scores. 157 Over one hundred prominent
social justice and civil rights organizations, many of which are
leaders in advocating for the reform and abolition of monetary
bail systems, have condemned such risk assessment tools.
1 5 8
Detractors claim that risk assessments are "like a factory ma-
chine that funnels people," rather than "address[ing] the root
cause of an issue."159
Despite these concerns, risk assessment tools are often
utilized as objective bases to release defendants on their own
recognizance or with limited pretrial conditions.160 Further,
risk assessment tools have actually been shown to help de-
crease overall rates of pretrial detention. Indeed, in a 2012
study, researchers analyzed data on 116,000 defendants from
1990 to 2006 and found that if judges had released all low-risk
defendants, or those with less than a 30% chance of being
rearrested during the pretrial period, 85% of pretrial defend-
ants would have been released. 161
However, SB 10's use of risk assessment tools may give rise
to various legal challenges. In this, there is very little judicial
guidance on the constitutional implications of risk assessment
tools, and the cases that have examined issues related to risk
assessments have not arisen in the pretrial context. 162 There-
157 See Michelle Alexander, The Newest Jim Crow, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 8, 2018),
https: / /www.nytimes.com/2018/1 1/08/opinion/sunday/criminal-justice-re
forms-race-technology.html [https: //perma.cc/JP2M-HA5N].
158 Sarah Lazare, Bernie Sanders and Kamala Harris Both Fall Short on Abol-
ishing Money Bail, IN THESE TIMES (Nov. 13, 2018), http://inthesetlmes.com/arti
cle/21575/bernie-sanders-and-kamala-harris-both-fall-short-on-bal-abolition
[https://perma.cc/F8M-HFNT]. "Decades of research have shown that such
data primarily document the behavior and decisions of police officers and prose-
cutors, rather than the individuals or groups that the data are claiming to de-
scribe." Id.
159 Id.
160 Multiple jurisdictions, such as Kentucky and Washington, D.C., already
use risk assessments in their pretrial programs, and these programs generally
have low failure to appear rates. Frequently Asked Questions: Pretrial Detention
Reform, supra note 46.
161 CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY PROGRAM, HARVARD LAW SCH., MOVING BEYOND
MONEY: A PRIMER ON BAIL REFORM 20 (2016), http://tinyurl.com/mzy6wzu [https:/
/perma.cc/BC4B-CTJD] (citing Shima Baradaran & Frank L. McIntyre, Predicting
Violence, 90 TEx. L. REV. 497, 553 (2012)).
162 See, e.g., State v. Loomis, 881 N.W.2d 749, 760 (Wis. 2016) (examining the
use of risk assessment at sentencing); State v. Duchay, 647 N.W.2d 467 (Wis. Ct.
App. 2002) (holding that a court's reliance on a risk assessment instrument in
[Vol. 104:18671890
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fore, depending on how the tools are used, substantial consti-
tutional considerations may come into play. For instance, a
challenge to SB 10 may attack its use of risk assessments on
the ground that these statistical tools rely on aggregate data,
thereby undermining "individualized and equal justice."163
One could argue that risk assessments disproportionately im-
pact minority groups. 164 Indeed, many critics assert that by
relying on underlying factors that are molded and skewed by
race or gender discrimination, risk assessment tools actually
reinforce and strengthen discrimination and inequality. 16 5
For example, risk assessments often consider a defen-
dant's prior interaction with the criminal justice system as an
objective factor. 166 However, the lens through which this factor
is viewed may itself be twisted by discrimination-discrimina-
tion that caused African Americans and Latinos to be dispro-
portionately exposed to law enforcement in the first place. 167
Similarly, factors such as educational history, housing insta-
bility, or other socioeconomic factors are likely to result in ra-
cial disparities because these factors correlate strongly with
sentencing was not a due process violation because the defendant did not show
that the information was inaccurate); Malenchik v. State, 928 N.E.2d 564, 575
(Ind. 2010) (upholding the use of a risk assessment ool in the sentencing
context).
163 Attorney General Eric Holder expressed the concern that actuarial risk
assessment "may inadvertently undermine our efforts to ensure individualized
and equal justice." Attny. Gen. Eric Holder, U.S. Dep't of Just., Remarks at




164 CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY PROGRAM, HARVARD LAW SCH., supra note 161, at 22.
165 See id.; see, e.g., Michael Tonry, Legal and Ethical Issues in the Prediction
of Recidivism, 26 FED. SENT'G REP. 167, 173 (2014) (concluding that reliance on
criminal histories and socioeconomic factors, such as age at time of first arrest,
custody status at time of first arrest, and total number of convictions, inherently
disadvantage minority defendants).
166 See id.
167 A California study found that 38% of Latinos and 33.7% of African Ameri-
cans are released pretrial, compared with 48.9% of whites and 54.6% of Asian
Americans. SONYA TAFOYA ET AL., PUB. POLeY INST. CALIFORNIA, PRETRIAL RELEASE IN
CALIFORNIA 14-15 (2017) https://www.ppic.org/content/pubs/report/R_0517
STR.pdf [https://perma.cc/24KX-K29N]; see, e.g., MARC MAUER & RYAN S. KING,
THE SENT'G PROJECT, UNEVEN JUSTICE: STATE RATES OF INCARCERATION BY RACE AND
ETHNICITY 4 (2007) https://www.sentencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/
2016/01 /Uneven-Justice-State-Rates-of-Incarceration-by-Race-and-Ethnicity
.pdf [https://perma.cc/5K2Y-LWBK] (finding that "[tihe American prison and Jaill
system is defined by an entrenched racial disparity in the population of incarcer-
ated people"). Research indicates that African American and Hispanic defendants
are more likely to be detained pretrial than are white defendants and less likely to
be able to post money bail as a condition of release. See PRETRIAL DETENTION
REFORM WORKGROUP, supra note 42, at 14.
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race.168 As such, factors deemed to be objective may not, in
fact, be objective at all. Using this same logic, SB 10's use of
risk assessments may appear to entrench and exacerbate ex-
isting racial and socioeconomic disparities by giving a "scien-
tific imprimatur" to unequal outcomes.169 If this is the case,
how can the use of any risk assessment tool pass constitu-
tional muster?
To pass constitutional scrutiny, a risk assessment tool that
determines or influences pretrial outcomes must conform to
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
170
However, even though equal protection principles generally
prohibit express classifications based on race or sex, or inten-
tional discrimination on those bases, the Constitution does not
prohibit policies that have an unintentional disparate impact on
particular groups, even if those disparities are foreseeable.
171
Factors such as prior criminal history, educational history, or
housing instability are not express classifications based on
race or sex. But even though these factors present as facially
neutral, they may have an unintended disparate impact on
certain minority groups. Nevertheless, because this impact is
unintentional, the use of these factors is constitutionally per-
missible. As such, an equal protection challenge to the use of
risk assessments in SB 10 would likely fail because there is no
mandate in SB 10 that requires the tool to use an express
classification based on race or sex, or to intentionally discrimi-
nate on those bases.172 Rather, SB 10 merely authorizes
courts to consider "[t]he recommendation of Pretrial Assess-
ment Services obtained using a validated risk assessment in-
168 CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY PROGRAM, HARVARD LAw SCH., supra note 161, at 22.
169 Id.
170 Equal protection principles generally prohibit the government from taking
adverse action against a person on the basis of certain protected characteristics,
particularly race, national origin, and sex. See, e.g., Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at
Austin, 570 U.S. 297, 310 (2013) (stating that government policies that rely on
suspect classifications" will survive judicial scrutiny only if they are narrowly
tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest). It has been argued that,
"[i]n the risk assessment context, those 'classifications' will consist of the inputs
that drive an assessment tool's statistical analysis," and therefore "equal protec-
tion considerations counsel strongly against using a system in which race or sex
are incorporated into risk scores." CRIMINAL JUS1ICE POLICY PROGRAM, HARVARD LAW
SCH., supra note 161, at 23.
171 See, e.g., Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 272-73, 279
(1979) ("[Elven if a neutral law has a disproportionately adverse effect upon a
racial minority, it is unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause only if
that impact can be traced to a discriminatory purpose.").
172 See id. at 279.
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strument."'173 The law does not mandate what specific factors
the risk assessments instruments should use.174 Individual
county risk assessments could be challenged on the grounds
that the underlying factors violate equal protection, but SB 10
itself could not successfully be challenged because it does not
specifically mandate the use of discriminatory factors.
Opponents of risk assessments also argue that the very
premise of a risk assessment tool-a tool that draws on "aggre-
gate data to make decisions about individuals"'175-violates
fundamental norms of fairness and due process. While an indi-
vidual's conduct is within that individual's control, that indi-
vidual has no control over others who share a characteristic
relevant for the risk assessment instrument. 17 6 How then can
an individual be judged simply by looking at the aggregate
conduct of thousands of other people?
The Constitution's due process protections require that,
before the government deprives a person of liberty, that person
must enjoy sufficient procedural safeguards that "minimize
substantively unfair or mistaken" outcomes. 17 7 The main fea-
tures of such procedural safeguards are reasonable notice and
opportunity to be heard. 178 In the pretrial context, the Salerno
Court emphasized that the procedural due process inquiry for
a preventative detention decision turns on whether a defendant
enjoys "procedures by which a judicial officer evaluates the
likelihood of future dangerousness [that] are specifically de-
signed to further the accuracy of that determination."'79 As
such, an SB 10 challenger could argue that the Constitution
requires the Salerno procedural due process principles to be
reflected in any procedure that relies on risk assessments. Es-
sentially, this argument asserts that a defendant must have an
opportunity to contest any potentially inaccurate or substan-
tively unfair risk assessment procedures. This broad argument
ultimately leaves all risk assessment tools vulnerable to due
process challenges on the ground that the tools have the capac-
ity to produce inaccurate or unfair results. However, having
the capacity to produce inaccurate or unfair results is mark-
edly different from actually producing inaccurate or unfair re-
173 California Money Bail Act (Senate Bill No. 10), CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 1320.20(f)(6) (West 2019) (effective Oct. 1, 2019).
174 See id.
175 CRIMINAL JUSCE POLICY PROGRAM, HARVARD LAW SCH., supra note 161, at 22.
176 Id. at 22-23.
177 Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 81 (1972).
178 See Mathews v. Eldrldge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976).
179 United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 751 (1987).
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sults, and the success of such a challenge turns on this
distinction.
There is currently no case law that illustrates a definition
or standard for what constitutes inaccurate or unfair risk as-
sessment results. However, case law in other legal areas sug-
gests some ways that jurisdictions could ensure adequate
procedures.18 0 For instance, in the sentencing context, the
Wisconsin Supreme Court upheld the use of a risk assessment
instrument, outlining several requirements for applying the
tool consistently with due process. In State v. Loomis, Loomis
argued that the risk assessment tool violated his due process
rights to be sentenced on accurate individualized information.
First, he contended that the risk assessment tool placed him
within a group and assessed risk based on certain shared char-
acteristics with others in that group. Thus, there was a danger
of overestimating the risk of an individual defendant based on
limited information. It is the character of the offender that the
court must consider, Loomis argued, not the class of people
with whom he is similar.181
Loomis also asserted that because it was not disclosed how
his risk scores were determined or how the factors were
weighed, he had been denied information that the Circuit Court
considered at sentencing. 182 Unless Loomis could review how
the factors were weighed and how the risk scores were deter-
mined, he claimed the accuracy of the risk assessment tool
could not be verified and therefore it violated his due process
rights. The court rejected his arguments, stating that even
though Loomis could not review and challenge how the risk
assessment algorithm calculated risk, he could at least review
and challenge the resulting risk scores set forth in the report.
The court concluded this, despite acknowledging that studies
of risk assessment tools have raised questions about the accu-
racy of such tools.
The Loomis court held that risk scores may not be consid-
ered the determinative factor in deciding whether an offender
can be supervised safely and effectively in the community.
183
The court further held that sentencing judges considering risk
reports must receive an accompanying advisory alerting them
to four points: (1) that the company that created the tool has
180 See, e.g., State v. Loomis, 881 N.W.2d 749, 764-66 (Wis. 2016) (consider-
ing the use of a risk assessment Instrument in the sentencing context).
181 See icL
182 I& at 761-63.
183 1I at 769.
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invoked its proprietary interest to prevent disclosure of how
factors are weighted or risk scores are determined; (2) that risk
assessment scores are based on group data and are able to
identify groups of high-risk offenders, not a particular high risk
offender; (3) that some studies of the tool being used have
"raised questions about whether they disproportionately clas-
sify minority offenders as having a higher risk of recidivism";
and (4) that the tool is based on a national sample that has not
been validated for Wisconsin and that risk assessment tools
must be constantly monitored and recalibrated for accuracy as
the population changes. 184
In the pretrial detention context, courts have held that
there should be safeguards in place to protect the weighty lib-
erty interests of a defendant because presumptively innocent
defendants face a deprivation of liberty. 185 In the case of bail
reform laws and SB 10, these safeguards should include a
variation of the four Loomis factors, thereby providing an ade-
quate advisory for judges to consider with regard to these risk
assessment tools. These safeguards would essentially ensure
that the defendant is provided with a substantive understand-
ing of how the risk assessment tool works, and the defendant
should be given a meaningful opportunity to contest the tool's
application, if necessary. The best way to ensure that these
procedural safeguards are implemented uniformly throughout
California is for SB 10 to provide that the safeguards must
include: "disclosing the defendant's risk assessment score, the
factors considered in determining the score, the relative
weights given to different factors, and information about when
and how the instrument was validated and re-normed, includ-
ing information about the population samples used in validat-
ing it."186 However, an adequate implementation of these
procedural safeguards depends on the strength and efficiency
of each county's PAS.
An efficient PAS would have the power to regulate the pro-
cedural framework that ensures that relevant information
about a risk assessment's accuracy is disclosed. PAS may do
this by conducting and researching studies demonstrating race
disparities or other inaccuracies caused by risk assessments in
that county, and by setting out distinct limitations for the role
184 Id. at 764.
185 See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 750-51 (1987).
186 CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY PROGRAM, HARVARD LAW SCH., supra note 161, at 24
(citing Melissa Hamilton, Risk-Needs Assessment: Constitutional and Ethical Chal-
lenges, 52 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 231, 271 (2015) ("considering potential due process
requirements in various contexts")).
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that the tool may play in shaping pretrial decisions. Because
SB 10 allows each county in California to choose its own vali-
dated risk assessment, it is up to the PAS of each county to
determine the manner in which they conduct their pretrial as-
sessments and use their risk assessment tools.
18 7 This indi-
vidualization of risk assessment tools allows each county to
tailor its risk assessments tool and PAS pre-arraignment prac-
tices to meet that county's specific needs.
However, despite the advantages of giving counties this
power, critics argue that SB 10 vests these counties with too
much discretion in deciding what risk assessment tools to use
and how exactly they should be used, especially since SB 10
does not require that the same risk assessment be imple-
mented throughout the state.188 While such concerns have
some validity, it is an exaggeration to claim that SB 10 vests
counties with a new type of power to choose in this area. In-
deed, counties have always had this power to some extent. For
instance, a 2015 survey of counties indicated that forty-six of
the fifty-eight California counties already use some type of pre-
trial program, and that 70% established their programs in the
past five years.189 Further, at least forty-two counties use a
type of pretrial risk assessment tool that provides judges with
information about the risk of releasing a defendant before
trial. 190
III
THE BIG PICTURE: A CONUNDRUM FOR THE
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM
Given SB 10's various advantages and weaknesses, the
criminal justice system is faced with a conundrum: should it
implement SB 10 and fund the various PAS programs neces-
sary to administer SB 10, or should SB 10 be repealed, thereby
maintaining the current wealth-based bail system despite the
many known consequences for both individual rights and soci-
ety? SB 10 represents a new door that has not yet been
opened-it is both hopeful and foreboding. Will it achieve its
goals, or open Pandora's box to even more bail problems? And
is the possibility of facing new and unexpected problems really
187 CAL. DEP'T OF FIN., supra note 131, at 4.
188 See Tyler & Raphling, supra note 123.
189 CALIFORNIANS FOR SAFETY & JUSTICE, THE CRIME & JUSTICE INST., PRETRIAL
PROGRESS: A SURVEY OF PRETRIAL PRACTICES AND SERVICES IN CALIFORNIA 6 (2015),
https://safeandjust.org/wp-content/uploads/PretrialSurveyBrief_8.26.15v2.pdf
[https: //perma.cc/N62L-2ARJ].
190 Id. at 7.
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threatening enough to forgo SB 10 altogether? This dichotomy
is one that has long-plagued criminal justice reform advocates.
A. Conditions of Pretrial Detention: A Thirteenth
Amendment Case Study
An illustration of the plight of the pretrial detainee and the
conditions of pretrial detention starts with the Thirteenth
Amendment.19 1 The Thirteenth Amendment, the language of
which has garnered attention recently,19 2 guarantees that
"[nleither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a pun-
ishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly con-
victed, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject
to their jurisdiction."'19 3 In the pretrial detention context, at
least one court has recently determined that certain conditions
of pretrial detention could violate the Thirteenth
Amendment. 194
In McGarry v. Pallito, McGarry was denied bail and ordered
into pretrial detention, where he was required to work in the
prison laundry for long hours, sometimes fourteen-hour shifts,
in hot, unsanitary conditions.195 When he objected to this
work, he was told that his refusal would put him in either
administrative segregation or "in the hole,"196 and that he
would receive an Inmate Disciplinary Report, which could af-
fect when sentenced inmates were eligible for release. The Sec-
ond Circuit found that even though McGarry was a pretrial
detainee, he was threatened by physical and legal coercion to
work, and therefore he had stated a claim that sufficiently al-
191 While this Note entertains the possibility of a Thirteenth Amendment chal-
lenge to SB 10 as an academic exercise, it does not argue that this legal challenge
is likely to be used to challenge SB 10, nor does it argue that this challenge would
have a significant likelihood of success if it were raised.
192 On November 6, 2018, Colorado voters approved an amendment to the
Colorado Constitution that completely abolishes slavery. Bill Chappell, Colorado
Votes to Abolish Slavery, 2 Years After Similar Amendment Failed, NPR (Nov. 7.
2018), https://www.npr.org/2018/11/07/665295736/colorado-votes-to-abol
ish-slavery-2-years-after-similar-amendment-failed [https: //perma.cc/Z3C4-
AQ4X]. This amendment will change Article I, Section 26 of the state's constitu-
tion, which closely mirrors the Thirteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution
and which, for over 100 years, stated, "There shall never be in this state either
slavery or involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime, whereof the
party shall have been duly convicted." Id. The new amendment instead states,
"There shall never be in this state either slavery or involuntary servitude." Id.
193 U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1.
194 McGarryv. Pallito, 687 F.3d 505, 511-12 (2d Cir. 2012).
195 Id. at 509-12.
196 "In the hole" referred to a punishment of isolation for twenty-three hours
per day and the use of shackles. Id. at 511-12.
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leged that his Thirteenth Amendment right to be free from in-
voluntary servitude was violated.
Thirteenth Amendment challenges may arise in other
forms as well, depending on the circumstances of the pretrial
detention. McGarry contemplated rehabilitation during incar-
ceration and stated that "it is clearly established that a state
may not 'rehabilitate' pretrial detainees. The Supreme Court
has unambiguously and repeatedly held that a state's author-
ity over pretrial detainees is limited by the Constitution in ways
that the treatment of convicted persons is not."19 7 And in Mc-
Ginnis v. Royster, the Supreme Court concluded that "it would
hardly be appropriate for the State to undertake in the pretrial
detention period programs to rehabilitate a man still clothed
with a presumption of innocence."198 Further, in Bell v. Wolf-
ish, the Supreme Court held that convicted prisoners retain
constitutional protections during incarceration, and the Court
reasoned that "[a] fortiori, pretrial detainees, who have not
been convicted of any crimes, retain at least those constitu-
tional rights that we have held are enjoyed by convicted
prisoners."19 9
Considering these rulings, the current bail system and its
overuse of pretrial detention-especially for individuals who
are detained because they simply cannot afford to pay their bail
amounts-raise significant concerns about the criminal justice
system's view of the presumption of innocence in America.
How can it be in accordance with the Constitution to subject a
man "clothed with a presumption of innocence"20 0 to pretrial
detention? A pretrial detainee-someone who has not yet been
convicted of any crime-is given "at least those constitutional
rights . . . enjoyed by convicted prisoners."201 But under the
presumption of innocence, shouldn't the constitutional protec-
tions include much more than that? The Supreme Court has
not given much direction on this issue, and the pretrial de-
tainee is thus left in an ambiguous constitutional void in which
they are put in pretrial detention by a wealth-based bail sys-
tem, treated as convicted detainees by the criminal justice sys-
tem, and condemned as criminals by the public.
California's SB 10 is an attempt to fill this void. It seeks to
create a presumption of release for all low-risk defendants,
197 I& at 513.
198 McGinnis v. Royster, 410 U.S. 263, 273 (1973).
199 Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 545 (1979).
200 McGinnis, 410 U.S. at 273.
201 Bell, 441 U.S. at 545.
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construct a careful legal process for ordering preventative de-
tention, and allow more instances of release on conditions as
an alternative to pretrial detention. Yet, despite the nobility of
this pursuit, SB 10 also generates a new kind of threat: the
creation of a bail system that is potentially worse, and poten-
tially more dangerous to individual rights, than the previous
one.
B. Opening Pandora's Box to a Potentially Worse Bail
System
In any reform attempt, there is always a possibility that
eradicating the old way will result in a new status quo that is
significantly worse. SB 10 seeks to reform the bail system by
allowing courts to release more defendants by imposing condi-
tions of release as an alternative to pretrial detention. How-
ever, will SB 10's use of conditions of release replace the
current practice of pretrial incarceration with a new regime of
"e-carceration?"20 2 Furthermore, which practice poses a bigger
threat to individuals? These questions have recently come to
the forefront of the SB 10 bail reform policy debate.20 3
In a regime of "e-carceration," if a pretrial detainee is re-
leased prior to trial, a court may impose restrictive conditions
of release that essentially create an "open-air digital prison."204
For instance, a court may release a defendant pretrial, but it
may order that the defendant wear an electronic-monitoring
ankle device with GPS tracking-a condition that seems rea-
sonable on its face and appears much less restrictive than
pretrial detention. However, that ankle device costs the defen-
dant around $300 each month in out-of-pocket expenses, and
it severely restricts the defendant's permitted zones of move-
ment, making it hard to keep a job, attend classes, or care for
children.20 5 Ultimately, even though that defendant is released
from physical pretrial detention, she remains confined in a
prison of e-carceration. She can live in her own home, yet she
is stuck in a web of restrictive conditions and she is constantly
monitored by an all-seeing technological spider. In an era
where foreign governments have the ability to hack into na-
tional elections20 6 and Facebook has the audacity to sell its




206 See Jane Mayer, How Russia Helped Swing the Election for Trump, NEW




customers' private data,20 7 the prospect of giving the govern-
ment, or government contractors, unfettered access to a per-
son's whereabouts is a frightening one. However, challenging
these conditions of release in court has seen little success.
In Holland v. Rosen, Holland claimed that the conditions of
his pretrial release were unconstitutional because they violated
the Fourth Amendment.20 In response, the Third Circuit as-
sumed, without explicitly deciding, that home detention and
electronic monitoring could constitute a search and seizure,
but nevertheless found no violation because (1) Holland has a
reduced expectation of privacy because he was arrested on
probable cause for a dangerous offense, and (2) the State "has a
substantial interest in ensuring that persons accused of crimes
are available for trials" and a "'legitimate and compelling' inter-
est in preventing crime by arrestees.
" 20 9
On the issue of conditions of release, the Holland ruling is
somewhat troubling. Even if a court finds that there is proba-
ble cause for a crime, does a defendant's reduced expectation of
privacy amount to having no expectation of privacy at all? After
all, that is what electronic ankle monitoring constitutes-a
complete lack of privacy for an unconvicted, and presumably
innocent, defendant. A GPS-tracking device allows the govern-
ment to track an individual's every movement for the purpose
of ensuring their appearance at court. However, would not a
less-intrusive condition of release have sufficed to ensure this
outcome? The answer is almost certainly yes. Having PAS
monitor the defendant by conducting weekly check-ins, either
by phone or in person, would allow the government to keep
track of the defendant, while also ensuring the defendant ap-
pears in court. There are numerous other conditions of release
that would produce the same result.
95GU]; see also Nicole Perlroth, D.N.C. Says It Was Targeted Again by Russian




=7&pgtype=collection [https://perma.cc/SKF4-KFKB] (reporting on the DNC's
belief that a Russian group attempted to hack the DNC right before midterm
elections In 2018).
207 See Alexis C. Madrigal, Facebook Didn't Sell Your Data; It Gave It Away,
ATLANTIC (Dec. 19, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/
2018/12/facebooks-failures-and-also-its-problems-leaking-data/578599/
[https://perma.cc/B57G-58E4].
208 Holland v. Rosen, 895 F.3d 272, 278 (3d Cir. 2018).
209 Id. at 302.
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INCARCERATION OR E-CARCERATION
SB 10 provides measures to guard against intrusions into
individual privacy by mandating that courts use the least re-
strictive conditions of release available. Under SB 10, individu-
als who are assessed as low-risk during a pre-arraignment
review will be released on their own recognizance by PAS and
the booking agency within twenty-four hours of booking (ex-
ceptions for those arrested for crimes such as domestic vio-
lence, multiple DUI offenses, and other factors).2 10 Based upon
the parameters set forth in state and local rules of court, indi-
viduals who are assessed as medium-risk (except for those ar-
rested for crimes such as domestic violence, multiple DUIs, and
other factors) will be released by PAS and the booking agency
with the least restrictive nonmonetary conditions of release,
such as supervision by PAS, GPS monitoring, or drug testing,
that will ensure public safety and return to court.2 11 Further,
SB 10 provides that defendants will not be required to pay for
these nonmonetary conditions of release.2 12 As such, although
the threat of an "e-carceration" regime is ever-present, SB 10
consciously seeks to safeguard against it.
CONCLUSION
California's bail system not only infringes on individual
rights, but also exacerbates a cobweb criminal justice system.
The In re Humphrey court framed the issue perfectly when it
stated that the problem with the bail system stems "from the
enduring unwillingness of our society, including the courts, to
correct a deformity in our criminal justice system that close
observers have long considered a blight on the system."2 13 Cal-
ifornia sought to rectify this "deformity"2 14 of a wealth-based
bail system by passing SB 10.
While legal arguments contending that SB 10 violates the
state constitutional right to bail may be entertained, these ar-
guments have a low likelihood of success. However, legislation
alone does not ensure success; rather, SB 10 needs adequate
funding and research to effectively implement PAS programs
throughout California's counties.2 15 A carefully constructed
210 California Money Bail Reform Act (Senate Bill No. 10), CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 1320.10(b) (West 2019) (effective Oct. 1, 2019).
211 See id. § 1320. 10(c).
212 See iAL § 1320. 10(d).
213 In re Humphrey, 228 Cal. Rptr. 3d 513, 545 (Cal. Ct. App. 2018) (citation
omitted).
214 Id.
215 "Though legislation is desperately needed, administration of the bail sys-
tem is committed to the courts. It will be hard, perhaps impossible, for judicial
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implementation plan, akin to New Jersey's plan for the CJRA,
is essential to SB 10's success. If SB 10 is not properly imple-
mented, funded, researched, and supervised, it will almost cer-
tainly increase the number of pretrial detainees and possibly
even create a new regime of "e-carceration" in California.
2 16
It is clear that bail reforms are inextricably linked to the
decarceration strategies underpinning them, but if SB 10's de-
carceration strategy is simply to replace one form of incarcera-
tion with another-"e-carceration"-then this bail reform will
inevitably fail. It would satisfy some immediate problems, but
would also create more problems in the future. This infinite
cycle of problems and solutions ultimately stems from the na-
ture of America's cobweb justice system, in which the true
roots of crime go much deeper to include mental health crises,
substance abuse, unaddressed trauma, housing and economic
instability, and discriminatory police practices.2 17 However,
looking at previous bail reform examples, SB 10 shows signifi-
cant promise in reforming one piece of California's criminal
justice system. It may not be clear whether the answer to bail
reform lies behind the SB 10 door, or if reformers are simply
knocking on the door from the inside, but what is clear is that
the current bail system is not working. It discriminates on the
basis of wealth, it takes advantage of the criminal justice sys-
tem for capitalist gain, and it profits none but the bail bond
industry. Thus, SB 10 may have flaws, but it is a hopeful step
forward in reforming California's bail practices and in creating
a fairer and more equitable criminal justice system.
officers to fully rectify the bail process without greater resources than our trial
courts now possess." In re Humphrey, 228 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 545.
216 See Lazare, supra note 158.
217 Anderson, supra note 147.
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